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Wireless sensor networks consist of low-cost, low-power electronic devices called sensor 
motes. The sensor motes are densely deployed to cooperatively detect and transmit back 
environmental and physical conditions of the environment in which they are deployed. 
As they can be deployed in a variety of environments, sensor networks have many 
applications including military applications, environmental applications, health 
applications, home applications and other commercial applications [1][2]. 
 
Motes usually contain a processor, transceiver, sensor board and a power source. The 
network also consists of a central base station and optional cluster heads. Sensor boards 
on the motes contain a range of possible sensors that can detect temperature, light 
intensity, humidity, mechanical stress and many other values. The data collected is 
analyzed by the processor and resulting values are transmitted using the transceiver to the 
base station through multi-hop routing protocols. Sensor networks suffer from inherent 
limitations like low power, low memory, low computational capability,   high degree of 
failure and  unpredictable environmental conditions in which they are deployed. Unlike 
normal motes, cluster heads and base station have higher memory and processing 
capabilities.
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Sensor networks are prone to a variety of attacks that include spoofed, altered or replayed 
routing information, selective forwarding, sinkholes, black-holes and worm-holes [3]. 
These attacks can cripple a sensor network and render them useless. Many detection 
algorithms are available for normal networks [4][5][6]. These intrusion detection 
algorithms cannot be used in sensor networks due their resource constrained nature. The 
algorithms must involve low computation, communication and memory usage to ensure 
the longevity of the network. Due to this limitation the detection algorithm involves a 
tradeoff between resource consumption and, accuracy and speed of detection. 
 
We focus our work on detecting selective forwarding attacks in sensor networks. 
Previous work done in detecting selective forwarding attacks [3][7] involves the use of 
multi-path routing and complex key mechanisms. These approaches introduce high 
energy consumption due to processing and communication requirements. Our approach 
to detecting the selective forwarding attacks has two main goals; decreasing energy 
consumption and achieving high accuracy. We also need to be able to trace back the 
attacker to aid in countermeasures to be taken in the network. 
 
Our solution for selective forwarding attack involves use of an acknowledgment based 
scheme like the one proposed in [7]. We limit the communication overhead involved by 
localizing the acknowledgments that are transmitted in the network. The 
acknowledgments transmitted are used to identify dropped packets in a network. We 
introduce a metric called maliciousness indicator (MI) which can tell us if a node is an 
attacker or not. A high value of maliciousness indicator indicates that a node is more 
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malicious and thus more likely an attacker. Using such a metric might decrease the 
accuracy of detection due to increased false positives. To counter this we have a 
maliciousness reduction constant (MRC), which can reward a node for normal behavior 
by reducing the maliciousness indicator on the motes. 
 
Any lost acknowledgements in the network might decrease the effectiveness of our 
algorithm. To solve this problem we make use of an acknowledgement method and 
propose other solutions that can be used. As maliciousness indicator is an important 
metric and must be tamper proof, we do not trust any node with its own maliciousness 
indicator value. Each node‘s MI is maintained by other nodes in the network. This node 
increases and decreases the MI based on the behavior it observes. 
 
In Chapter II we review the previous done in detecting selective forwarding attacks in 
sensor networks and also introduce hardware used in wireless sensor networks. In 
Chapter III, we provide the details of our approach to detect selective forwarding. In 
Chapter IV we provide and compare the results from our experiments running the 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In this chapter we describe the radio hardware used on the motes and previous work done 
on selective forwarding.  
 
2.1. CC2420 Radio 
 
The type of motes in our network is TelosB [8]. Each TelosB mote uses a CC2420 
transceiver [10] which follows the IEEE 802.15.4 [9] standard for personal area 
networks. It also supports the Zigbee standard [11] which builds on the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard to add upper level layer standards. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard specifies that a 
link quality indicator (LQI) is to be calculated for each packet a CC2420 radio receives, 
along with other information about the packet like received signal strength indicator 
(RSSI). LQI calculation is based on the chip error rate observed during communication 
between two motes in the network [9]. The computed value is encapsulated in the packet 
header and transmitted to the applications running in the network. Applications like 
routing can make use of this value to differentiate between good and poor links in a 
network.
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A higher LQI value observed on a link indicates a good communication link. On the other 
hand a low LQI value on a link means that the link is poor in quality. In [12], it is 
identified that the packet reception rate (PRR) observed on a communication link has 
strong correlation with LQI value when sufficiently large number of LQI values are 
collected and averaged. The packet reception rate thus computed can be used to estimate 
the number of packets lost due to bad link quality in a network. Estimating the normal 
packet loss due to collisions and poor communication links can be useful in separating it 
from malicious dropping of packets in a network. 
 
2.2. Selective Forwarding Attacks 
 
A wireless sensor network employs different multihop routing protocols to transmit data 
from the nodes sensing the information to the base station. A packet originating at a node 
must be received and retransmitted by other nodes on the path towards the base station. 
This proper forwarding of packets is integral to the proper functioning of the routing 
protocol and hence the proper functioning of the wireless sensor network. 
A malicious node on the path towards the base station might not forward the packets 
properly to other nodes. If an attacker chooses to drop all the packets it is supposed to 
forward, it is called a black-hole [3]. Such an attack is easily detected due to the huge loss 
of packets easily detected by the base station. Rather than dropping all the packets, an 
attacking node can refuse to forward some of the packets that it should forward.  The loss 
of information and control packets being transmitted in the network will be high in such 
cases. This kind of attack where a node selectively drops some packets is called selective 
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forwarding attack [3]. A node performing selective forwarding is hard to detect [3] as the 
number of messages being dropped is chosen to minimize the risk of detection. 
 
2.3. Previous Work and Our Approach 
 
In [7] the authors propose an acknowledgment based scheme to detect selective 
forwarding attack. In their algorithm, each packet being generated in the network has two 
fields added to its header; ACK_span and ACK_TTL. At each hop the ACK_span value 
in a packet is decreased. When it reaches zero, an acknowledgement messages is 
generated and transmitted on the path towards the source. This acknowledgement 
messages has a time to live value of ACK_TTL. Each node which forwarded the packet 
waits for a specified amount of time to see if an acknowledgement is received. If the 
packet is not received within the specified time period, it raises an alarm packet and 
transmits it back to the source. All the nodes raise such alarm packets and they get 
transmitted to the source. The source node analyzes all the alarm packets received and 
decides if a node not sending the acknowledgement message is an attacker. If an attacker 
is found, the source informs the base station.  
 
There are many drawbacks in the approach taken in [7]. There is an acknowledgement 
message being transmitted for every normal message being sent. Furthermore alarm 
packets are sent back all the way to the source or the base station. This increases the 
communication overhead for every packet generated by the source nodes in a network. 
As long battery life is a key component in the success of a wireless sensor network; high 
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communication overhead reduces the battery life. The approach also uses a synchronized 
clock for time-stamping the alarm packets. This is necessary in the algorithm as many 
alarm packets might be generated by a node and the source needs to know which of them 
is a fresh packet. A synchronized clock is difficult to implement in sensor networks and 
requires additional overhead, again consuming battery life. The third drawback in this 
approach is that it does not consider the normal packet loss in a network. Any wireless 
network has normal packet loss due to poor link qualities. This loss must be quantified 
and taken into account when deciding if a packet is intentionally dropped. As such 
quantification is not made, the accuracy of detection decreases rapidly with increase in 
channel error rate. 
 
Our approach in detecting selective forwarding attacks also uses an acknowledgment 
based scheme for detecting attackers. We try to reduce the communication overhead in 
the network by decreasing the required number of acknowledgment messages and 
localizing them in the network. There is no communication with the source or the base 
station.  Missing packets in a network increase the maliciousness indicator of node 
maintained by its neighbors. The intentionally dropped packets and normal loss of 
packets are differentiated using the correlation between LQI and PRR. This will help 
improve the accuracy of detection. Our approach also decreases the overhead involved by 







3.1. Network Architecture 
 
We consider a wireless sensor network divided into clusters. Each cluster has a cluster 
head which has greater computational and communicational capabilities. These cluster 
heads can be Stargate gateways [13]. Normal sensor nodes in the network can be any 
motes like micaZ [14] and TelosB [8], which follow 802.15.4 [9] and Zigbee [10] 
specifications. A central base station collects all the data and controls the sensor network. 
This base station can be a server class computer. Figure 1 shows the network architecture. 
The base station is denoted by BS. Dotted rectangles represent clusters of normal sensor 
nodes with a cluster head denoted by CH. 
 











Normal motes sense the information from their environment and report it to the base 
station using a multi-hop routing protocol. Any multi-hop routing protocol like [15] [16] 
developed for sensor networks can be used for this purpose. Apart from transmitting data 
packets, normal nodes detect attackers in the network and use report the attacker id to the 
cluster heads.  
 
A cluster head uses multi-hop routing protocol to communicate with other cluster heads 
and the bases station. Any communication between among cluster heads and the base 
station is to be secure for obvious reasons. Due to the greater computation power 
available [13] complex encryption algorithms which cannot be used by normal nodes can 




We assume a static network (no node movement). The communication among the cluster 
heads and the base station is assumed to be secure due to the greater computational power 
at their disposal. We assume that there is no attack taking place within the first few 
minutes when the network is deployed. Any attack can be avoided by properly planning 






3.3. Proposed Approach 
 
Our approach involves the use of an acknowledgment based scheme to detect selective 
forwarding. This approach is similar to the one used in [7]. To improve efficiency we use 
a localized cumulative acknowledgement based scheme. The accuracy of detection will 
also be increased with the help of a probability based metric to decrease the probability of 
false alarm. 
 
3.3.1. Relay of Acknowledgements 
 
Consider the part of the network presented in figure 2. A, X and B are nodes on the path 
taken by the data towards the base station. A forwards the data it receives to X, and X 
forwards it to B. To detect if X is an attacker we need to send acknowledgements from B 
to A for the packets that are successfully forwarded by X. In a network that is sufficiently 
dense we will be able to find two nodes M and N that are in communication range with 
both A and B. These nodes act as the intermediaries for transmitting the 
acknowledgements from B to A.  Hence the behavior of a node is reported by other 
independent nodes who cannot communicate with each other. Using these two 
intermediate nodes, we are able to localize the transmission of acknowledgements and 
ensure low communication. If an intermediate node is compromised, the other can relay 
back fair acknowledgements. Using two intermediate nodes reduces the risk involved; as 
probability of two nodes being compromised is less than probability that one node is 
compromised. And the two intermediate nodes should not be able to communicate with 
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each other. Doing so would mean that they can collude and tamper the packets in a 
similar way so as to make it difficult to detect. 
 
 
Figure 2: Communication model 
Considering a unit disc radio model of radius r, for our approach to work the following 
constraints must be satisfied: 
 
AX  r – node X should be within communication range of node A. 
BX  r – node B should be within communication range of node X. 
AN  r – node N should be within communication range of node A. 
BN  r – node B should be within communication range of node N. 
AM  r – node M should be within communication range of node A. 
BM  r – node B should be within communication range of node M. 
MN > r – node M should not be within communication range of node N. 
















For our approach the key notion is of node density. Inside a fixed region, one cannot have 
too dense a region or the above constraints will be violated. We propose to define the 
densities and regions needed for our approach. This will be derived during the remainder 
of the project.  
 
We can reduce the number of acknowledgements that need to be transmitted by using 
cumulative acknowledgements. Instead of sending an acknowledgement for every packet 
received, one acknowledgement can be sent for every n seconds. This message would 
contain the number of packets received in the last n seconds. Here, n is an integer 
dependent on the data rate in the network. The higher the data rate, the higher n should be 
to minimize energy consumption. For example, a sensor network that monitors 
temperature would have a low data rate compared to a network that senses light intensity, 
as temperature cannot change as rapidly as light intensity. Hence, the network monitoring 
light intensity would have a higher n compared to the network monitoring temperature. 
 
3.4. Packet Reception Rate Vs. LQI 
 
Due to the nature of the medium involved for communication, the efficiency of 
communication in a sensor network is not perfect. Environmental conditions and the 
distance between the nodes also limit the efficiency of the communication. We need to 
differentiate between the normal packet loss occurring in a network and the intentional 
dropping of packets. To achieve this goal, we use the link quality indicator (LQI) [9] 
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computed by the CC2420 radio [10]. It has been shown that when sufficiently large 
number of LQI values are collected and averaged, there is a strong correlation between 
the packet reception rate (PRR) and LQI [12]. Figure 3 shows the second order trend line 
that has been obtained by performing regression analysis of the data we obtained from the 
authors of [12] and also from our experimental observations.  
 
Considering the resource constrained nature of the sensor nodes, we used a second order 
curve to perform the regression analysis. The resulting equation is  














Figure 3: Packet reception rate vs. LQI 
 
The PRR that is computed is adjusted to cope for the error induced by regression analysis. 
If the PRR of a link is found to be higher than the value that is computed through the 
second order equation, the expected PRR is adjusted accordingly. This process is 






3.5. Proposed Algorithm 
 
The proposed acknowledgement based scheme to detect selective forwarding attacks in a 
sensor network can be divided into two phases. The discovery and learning phase and the 
attack detection phase. The actual working of these phases is presented in the following 
subsections. 
 
3.5.1. Learning and Discovery Phase 
 
As discussed earlier, when a wireless sensor network is deployed, we assume that there is 
no attack taking place in the network. Typically the routes towards the base station are 
established in this phase and the various tables like the neighbor table and routing table 
are initialized and populated. 
 
For our purpose we increase the amount of work done in this phase to include the 
discovery of intermediate nodes and also the discovery of routes between intermediate 






3.5.1.1. Discovering Intermediate Nodes 
 
In many routing algorithms a beacon packet is broadcast by each node in the network. 
This packet helps in the discovery of a node‘s neighbors. Once the neighbors are 
discovered, the routes towards the base station are established. 
We now describe a notation for simplifying the discussion about the intermediate 
discovery process. Let X, A be the ID‘s of nodes in the network. We define,  
 
)(XParent as the ID of the node to which the packets arriving at X are forwarded. 
)(XNeighbors  as the set of all the neighbors of X. 
),( AXteIntermedia as the set of intermediate nodes between X and A. Intermediate 
nodes between X and A can be defined as the nodes that can communicate with both X 
and A. 
 
We introduce a new packet called the intermediate node discovery packet (INT_DISC). 
The purpose of this packet as the name implies is to help in the discovery of intermediate 
nodes. The structure of the packet is shown in figure 4. The first field in the packet 
contains the ID of the sender. The second field called the parent contains the 
value )(SenderParent . The last field contains the set )(SenderNeighbors . 
 
Sender Parent (Sender) Neighbors (Sender) 
Figure 4: Intermediate node discovery (INT_DISC) packet structure 
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After all the neighbors of a node are discovered and routes towards the base station are 
established, the intermediate node discovery packet is transmitted. The routes towards the 
base station and the neighbor list might change due the discovery of new neighbors in a 
network. To counter this scenario, the INT_DISC packet is retransmitted at regular 
intervals. 
We also change the neighbor table at each node as follows. 
Neighbor ID Parent(Neighbor) Neighbors(Neighbor) 
   
   
Figure 5: Neighbor Table 
 
When a node, say with ID ‗receiver‘, receives the INT_DISC packet, it checks the sender 
ID to see if it is equal to Parent (Receiver). If the values are not equal the neighbor table 
is updated with the new information received from ‗sender‘. If the two values are found 
to be equal the process of discovering intermediate nodes begins. The neighbor table of 
‗receiver‘ is scanned to see if the Parent (Sender) occurs in it. If it occurs, the neighbor 
ID from that row in the neighbor table is obtained and added to the Intermediate 
(Receiver, Parent (Sender)) set. Thus, the intermediate nodes set can be obtained. The 
algorithm for this process is given below. In the algorithm we denote P->Q as the value 




Figure 6: Algorithm for Intermediate Node Discovery 
 
3.5.1.2. Learning Link Statistics 
 
In the discovery and learning phase, adjustments to the relation between link quality and 
packet reception rate is performed. We know that the equation between LQI and PRR 
obtained by regression analysis is not perfect. There is an error in the equation that needs 
to be addressed. 
 
During the initial few minutes, after the routes towards the base station have been 
established, the acknowledgment scheme is implemented. This presents the opportunity 
to tune the PRR value that is expected on a link. If the expected PRR on a link is less than 
or more than the actual PRR, the expected PRR is to be changed to reflect the actual 
PRR. This adjustment can be performed as we assume that there is no attacker within the 
first few minutes after the network is deployed. 
 
AT Receiver 
IF (INT_DISC packet received) 
 IF (Parent (Receiver) = Sender) 
  FOR (each Neighbor in Neighbor Table) 
   IF (Parent (Sender) IN Neighbors (Neighbor)) 
    Intermediate (Receiver, Parent (Sender)) += Neighbor 
 ELSE 
  Neighbor_Table (Sender)->Neighbors = Neighbors (Sender) 
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All the observed PRR values during the first few minutes are accumulated during the 
learning and discovery phase of the network. These values are averaged and this averaged 
value becomes the new expected PRR of the link under observation. After this phase, 
there is no learning taking place in the network. This is due to the fact that the actual 
discrepancy in PRR might be due to an attacker. 
 
3.5.2. Attack Detection Phase 
 
This is the second phase of network operation. The actual attack detection takes place in 
this phase. This phase does not end and continues as long as the network is operational. 
 
3.5.2.1. Identifying Packet Losses 
 
Consider figure 2 shown above. When node A transmits data downstream towards the 
base station, X receives the data and forwards it to node B. There are two sets of packet 
losses occurring in this data transfer. One loss occurs when A sends data to X and the 
other occurs when X sends data to B. The loss occurring when A sends data to X cannot 
be considered in detecting the number of packets dropped by X. Only the loss occurring 
between X and B may be considered. 
 
We need to quantify the number of packets lost on the link from A to X. This can be done 
if we obtain the LQI value of the link from A to X. Using the LQI value we can predict 
the packet reception rate of the link and deduct the loss from X. If symmetric links are 
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considered, LQI value of the link from A to X will be equal to the LQI value of the link 
from X to A. This LQI value can be used to compute the packet loss over the link. 
 
If symmetric links are not considered, we need to identify the LQI value using other 
approaches. One approach would be to obtain the value reported by X to the intermediate 
nodes between X and parent(A). X reports the LQI value of the link A to X to parent(A) 
as part of the detection process. Hence, using the value provided by its parent, A can 
predict the number of packets dropped on the link from A to X. 
 
The value reported by parent(A) to A can be the average of the previous three LQI 
values. The average of the last three LQI values means that A has sampled a lot of 
packets and computed the LQI value. Each LQI value means that the number of messages 
was as equal to number of messages transmitted in n seconds in the network. Such 
average over a large sampling of packets can ensure the accuracy in the prediction of data 
loss from A to X. 
 
Let l1 be the number of packets lost on the link from A to X. We can obtain the value of l1 
by using the number of packets transmitted by A and, using regression analysis to get the 






3.5.2.2. Processing Acknowledgment Messages 
 
As previously described acknowledgements should be transmitted every n seconds. We 
call these messages ACK packets. ACK packets have the structure shown in figure 7. 
Number of messages 
received (NACK) 
Expected packet reception 
rate (PRR) 
Average link quality 
observed (LQI) 
Figure 7: ACK message structure 
 
Here NACK is the number of messages observed by the sender and the PRR field 
corresponds to the expected packet reception rate at the sender. 
Consider the scenario from figure 2. ACK packets are sent by node B every n seconds to 
both M and N which are the intermediate nodes. The intermediate nodes relay these 
packets to the node A upstream (towards the source). We define the following notation. 
Let: 
 
NACK be the number of messages that have been acknowledged by node B (obtained from 
ACK message). 
NTX be the actual number of messages that have been transmitted by node A. 
LT be the total number of packets lost. 
l1 be the number of packets lost on the link from A to X. 
l2 be the number of packets lost on the link from X to B. 
la  be the acceptable loss on the link X to B computed by A using the PRR received from 
node B. 
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lu  be the unacceptable loss on the link X to B computed by A. 
 
The total number of packets lost, LT, can be defined by the following equation. 
LT = NTX - NACK 
 
The actual number of packets lost on the link X to B is L2 given by, 
l2 = NTX – NACK – l1 
 
Acceptable loss of packets based on the PRR obtained from the ACK message can be 





lNa TXl  
 
Unacceptable loss of packets can be computed using the equation, 
ll alu 2  
 
Here lu  number of packets are unaccounted for and are considered to be an act of 
selective forwarding by the node supposed to forward the packets. 
 




Figure 8: Algorithm for processing ACK packets 
 
3.5.2.3. Probability Model 
 
From the analysis of figure 3, we observe that the regression analysis does not predict the 
packet reception rate for a given link quality indicator value with 100% accuracy. This 
introduces the possibility of a normal node being falsely identified as an attacker 
performing selective forwarding. For example, the equation might give us an expected 
packet reception rate of 85% for an LQI value of 75. The actual packet reception rate 
AT Sender 
 
EVENT: Packet Received { 
 NACK = NACK +1 
} 
EVENT: n seconds elapsed { 
 ACK_MSG-> NACK = NACK 
 ACK_MSG->PRR = Expected PRR 




EVENT: Packet Sent { 
 NTX = NTX + 1 
} 
EVENT: ACK_MSG received { 
NACK = ACK_MSG->NACK 
PRR = ACK_MSG->PRR 
 





lNa TXl  
ll alu 2  
} 
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occurring in this particular case might be 80%. The node under consideration would 
falsely be categorized as malicious. To avoid this, we need a maliciousness indicator 
which provides some sort of leniency. 
 
To achieve a model, we performed experiments on 2 TelosB motes and came up with the 
following distribution for the packet reception rate at various LQI value ranges. A mote 
was programmed to send 200 packets at 1 packet per second towards the other mote. 
Once all the transmissions are complete, we obtained the average LQI and PRR over the 
test run. More than a hundred tests were conducted using the scenario. 
 
For LQI values between 80 and 90, we observed the distribution of packet reception rates 
as shown in figure 9. From the figure, we can observe that the highest concentration of 
packet reception rate is within a range of -1 to 1 times the standard deviation. 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of PRR values from the mean 
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The number of times a PRR value greater than or less than the standard deviation was 
observed is very slim (as shown from the graph above). Using this information, we can 
approximate the probability that the observed PRR value is within one times the standard 
deviation and similarly, within two times the standard deviation. This probability value 
will be used to probabilistically increment the maliciousness indicator of the node. 
Probability that observed PRR value is, *1*1 PRR , where  represents the 
standard deviation, can be given by the following equation. 
 
Pr = Area under the curve from -1 to 1 / Total area under the curve 
 












In the above equation the function f(x) represents the distribution of packet reception 
rates in the network. Using regression analysis on the data provided in figure 9, we obtain 
the function, 
 
8.3433.41892.5)( 2 xxxf  
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Similarly the probability that the observed PRR differs from the expected PRR by more 
than one times the standard deviation and less than two times the standard deviation can 















Similar experiments can be performed by varying the LQI values and a distribution of 
PRR values can be found. Using this distribution the probability that a node is malicious 
can be computed. 
 
3.5.2.4. Maliciousness Indicator 
 
As show in Figure 6, the unacceptable loss ul can be computed. This unacceptable loss 
just gives us the raw packets that we think are maliciously dropped. In the previous 
section we showed why such raw numbers can lead to false positives and proposed a 
probability model to counter such scenarios. 
 
We need an indicator that can say how probable it is that a node we are observing is a 
malicious node. This indicator is the maliciousness indicator. Each node receiving 
acknowledgements probabilistically computes the maliciousness indicator based on the 
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PRR values reported in the acknowledgement messages and the distribution of PRR 
calculated as shown in section 3.5.2.3. 
 
Once the unacceptable loss ul is computed we need to determine the amount by which the 
reported packet reception rate differs from the expected packet reception rate. Based on 
the difference computed we probabilistically increase the maliciousness indicator of each 
node. 
 
Let XA be the maliciousness indicator of node X as computed by node A. Once the 
unacceptable loss and the probability that the observed PRR is correct are computed, we 
can use the following equation to compute the new maliciousness indicator of X as 











In the above equation Pr is the probability that the observed PRR is correct. For example 
let us consider that the difference between the observed PRR at B on the link XB differ 
by more than one times the standard deviation and less than two times the standard 
deviation. This information can be used to compute the value of Pr2 as described in the 
previous section. Based on LQI ranges, mean PRR and standard deviation (see table 1), 
the respective probabilities will be added to determine the probability that the received 
PRR is an expected value for that LQI range.   This value will be used to compute the 
new maliciousness indicator. 
 27 
Using this probabilistic approach we can ensure that the nodes that report more deviant 
values of PRR will be punished more and those differing just a little will be given a 
chance to recover and thereby decreasing the overall false positives. 
3.5.2.5. Maliciousness Reduction 
 
Consider a scenario where a node drops a large number of packets at once due to 
unforeseen collisions in the network. If there are no acknowledgements for packets in the 
networks, this loss of packets will result in the increase of maliciousness indicator of a 
node. This indicator will then stay at the current value and likely cause the node to be 
confirmed as an attacker. Such scenarios must be reduced in the network. 
To achieve the above goal, we introduce a maliciousness reduction constant. This 
constant will be used to reduce the maliciousness indicator of a node if it behaves 
normally. A node is said to behave normally if it does not drop any packets intentionally. 
The same condition can be expressed in terms of unacceptable loss, as having zero 
unacceptable loss of packets. A reduction constant will help reduce the number of false 
positives in the network. The amount by which maliciousness of a node is reduced is 





Where, is the reduction constant used in the network. Figure 10, describes the steps 
followed when an acknowledgement message is received. 
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Figure 10: Flowchart showing execution flow when an ACK_MSG is received 
 
3.5.2.6. Confirming an Attack 
 
Each time an acknowledgement message is received; new maliciousness indicator values 
are computed. To confirm that an attack is actually taking place in the network, we need 

























in the network crosses this threshold we say that a selective forwarding attack is taking 
place in the network. 
 
Let Ta be the threshold at which we say a node is performing selective forwarding attack. 
In settling on an appropriate threshold we must consider the tradeoff between speed and 
accuracy. A low threshold might result in higher speed of detection but has the side effect 
of raising false alarms. On the other hand, a high threshold ensures that there are less 
false positives but sacrifices in speed are inevitable. 
 
The value of Ta is also application specific. For example a network performing sensitive 
data gathering for the military might have a need to be more accurate to avoid loss of 
lives and resources. For this purpose we would have a higher threshold to decrease the 
number of false positives. A medical network sensing vital information about patients 
must be fast in detecting any attacks. In such a scenario, observing more false positives 
might be reasonable. 
 
3.6. Other Issues 
 
There are a few issues that need to be addressed to ensure that our detection approach 





3.6.1. Ensuring Acknowledgement safety 
 
In any wireless network, there is a possibility that a message might be lost due to 
collisions. If an acknowledgement message is lost due to collisions, the speed of 
detection would be adversely affected. There is also a possibility that a malicious node is 
jamming the frequency to stop acknowledgement messages from reaching the nodes 
upstream. 
 
As we make use of cumulative acknowledgements, the value of acknowledgement 
messages is increased. Therefore the tolerance for the loss of such information is 
drastically reduced. To address these issues each node receiving any acknowledgement 
messages must respond by sending an ACK message. A node sending the 
acknowledgement messages will retransmit the message until an ACK message is 
received from the nodes upstream. 
 
Another approach to address the issue would be the use of a frequency hopping 
mechanism [17]. Each node can send the acknowledgement messages on a frequency 
channel other than the one used for normal communication. This channel will have fewer 
collisions as it is only used for sending acknowledgement messages. 
If utmost security is needed, both the approaches can be used in conjunction. A 
predefined frequency hopping mechanism only known to the intermediate nodes and the 
node upstream can be used to relay acknowledgements on different channels. 
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3.6.2. Reporting an Attacker 
 
When an attack is confirmed by a node in the network it must ensure that this information 
is passed on to the cluster head. The cluster heads can then pass this information back to 
the base station and take any actions it sees fit. 
 
To ensure that the information concerning an attack is reported to the cluster head, the 
node detecting the attack floods the network with a high priority message containing data 
about the type of attack observed, the Id of the node performing the attack and the 
reporters Id (its own Id). This broadcasting might cause congestion in that network. To 
avoid the disruption of normal operation, a controlled flooding mechanism is used. Each 
node transmits to only two of its neighbors on the route towards the base station. These 
two nodes would append their Id to the message and forward the message. 
 
When all such messages finally reach the cluster head, it can trace back the attacker. 
Apart from tracing back the attacker, the cluster head would also have a topology map by 
constructing a routing tree based on the alarm messages received. This topology map and 







The effectiveness of any intrusion detection algorithm can be measured based on its 
accuracy of detection. This means that an algorithm having lower false positives is better 
than one having higher false positives. In the case of wireless sensor networks, we must 
also consider the energy consumed by an algorithm. As energy is very scarce in sensor 
networks, an algorithm that consumes as little energy as possible is required. For example 
an intrusion detection algorithm might achieve high accuracy by consuming more energy. 
Such a detection mechanism would be a poor choice since wireless sensor networks 
should minimize power consumption. 
 
4.1. Measuring PRR Distribution 
 
Analyzing the effectiveness of the algorithm would require proper quantification of the 
distribution of packet reception rate (PRR) for a given range of link quality indicator 
(LQI) values. In order to obtain and analyze the distributions, we set up a network of 10 
TelosB motes. Each mote was programmed using TinyOS to broadcast 200 packets of 
data at one second intervals to all other motes in the network. 
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To avoid collisions, only one mote designated as the sender, transmitted the data in the 
network at any particular point of time. When the other motes in the network receive this 
information they read the LQI value from the broadcasted packet and use this to calculate 
the average LQI over all the packets received. They also compute the number of packets 
they successfully received from the sender. After a node finished transmitting 300 
packets, another node is designated as sender. This test was repeated a number of times 
by changing the locations of the motes to observe variation in LQI values. 
When a sender completed transmitting data each mote was given a command to send the 
data back to the base station attached to a computer. The following results were observed 
from the experiments conducted. The PRR distribution for different LQI value ranges can 
be seen to follow Rayleigh distribution. 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of PRR where LQI is greather than 100 
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Figure 11 above shows the distribution of packet reception rate for link quality indicator 
values greater than 100. When the LQI is greater than 100, the average PRR over the 
observed results was found to be 99.66. The standard deviation from this PRR was found 





Figure 12: Distribution of PRR values where LQI is between 90 and 100 
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Figure 13: Distribution of PRR values where LQI is between 80 and 90 
 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of PRR values where LQI is less than 80 
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Similar analysis was performed for LQI value ranges 90 to 100, 80 to 90 and less than 80. 
The resulting graphs are shown in figure 11, figure 12 and figure 13 respectively. The 
mean PRR values and the standard deviation of the PRR values for each range of LQI 
values are provided in table 1. 
 
LQI Ranges Mean PRR Standard Deviation 
> 100 99.66 1.14 
> 90 & < 100 97.64 2.52 
> 80 & < 90 93.16 3.77 
< 80 78.72 9.26 
 
Table 1: Mean PRR and Standard deviation for different LQI ranges 
 
4.2. Experimental Setup 
 
To analyze the effectiveness of the detection algorithm, we made use of both TOSSIM 
simulator and real motes. The programs were written in nesC for the TinyOS operating 
system. After the programs were verified to work properly in TOSSIM, the real network 






4.2.1. Network Topology 
 
A network of five TelosB motes was setup to analyze the algorithm we developed. These 
motes were arranged as shown in figure 15. As described earlier, two motes were 
intermediate nodes for our algorithm. The remaining three motes were designated as the 
downstream node, node under investigation and the upstream node in the network. The 
positioning of the motes was carefully adjusted by taking into consideration, the required 
average link quality at each node. 
 
Figure 15: Network Topology 
 
In figure 15, node A sends data to node X. Node X must forward the data to node B on 
path towards the base station. Here X is the node under suspicion. There are two other 
nodes M and N, which are placed so that they can communicate with both A and B. 
These are the intermediate nodes that can be used to relay acknowledgements from B to 
A. The solid arrows in the figure depict the path take by normal data packets. Dotted lines 




B A X 
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4.2.2. Network and Algorithm Parameters 
 
Node A in the network was programmed to send data at 1 packet per second towards the 
base station. Node X was instructed to drop packets at different rates ranging from 5% to 
30% of the packets received. The attack was simulated using this scenario. 
As the data was sent at 1 packet every second, the value of n (time between ACK_MSG 
transmissions) was set at 100 seconds. This ensures that the average LQI value would 
give a fair estimate of the actual link quality. Each node was programmed with an initial 
maliciousness indicator ( a ) of 0.1. Hence node A would have an initial maliciousness 
indicator (MI) of 0.1 on node X (the suspicious node). The maliciousness reduction 
constant used in our tests was 0.1. 
 
Each node in the network was programmed with the values in Table-1. These values were 
used to store the mean packet reception rate and standard deviation for different LQI 
value ranges in the nodes. This table functions as a lookup table for the probability 
computed by the nodes, that a reported PRR is correct for observed LQI values. 
Moreover, the regression equation for finding the PRR with respect to a particular LQI 
was programmed into the nodes. 
 
Once the real network was started, it was allowed to continue execution until 20 minutes. 
All the data logged by the motes was then collected and analyzed. With the same 
network, an attacker was not included and the experiment was repeated for 20 minutes. 
For each network configuration more than 20 such tests were conducted. As discussed 
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previously, threshold value must be carefully chosen to avoid false positives. For the 
results obtained from the experiments with different network configurations, we analyzed 
the increase in maliciousness indicator of the attacker. Different values for the threshold 
were analyzed and 4.5 were found to be a good threshold for MI in our network 
conditions. At this value, we found that we were achieving a balance between required 
accuracy of detection and time taken to detect an attacker. If a node was not detected as 
an attacker, i.e. did not cross the threshold even after 20 minutes, we assumed that our 
algorithm could not detect the attacker anymore. 
 
To ensure that ACK_MSG transmissions by the intermediate nodes are not lost due to 
collisions or poor link quality in the network, we made use of ACK messages. As 
discussed earlier, a node must acknowledge the receipt of ACK_MSG transmission by 





4.3.1. Detection Accuracy 
 
Figure 16 shows the accuracy of detection with respect to packet drop rate at node X at 
different LQI value ranges. It can be observed that the accuracy of detection increases as 
the amount of packets maliciously dropped by the attacker increases. This behavior can 
be attributed to the fact that it is easier to accurately detect an attacker when the 
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difference between the actual loss rate in the network and the amount of maliciously 
dropped packets is high. 
 
 
Figure 16: Graph showing the detection of accuracy for different LQI ranges 
 
In the case where LQI values were greater than 100, the accuracy of detection was found 
to be 100%. Similarly for LQI values between 90 and 100, the accuracy of detection was 
100% at all packet drop rates. When the LQI values observed were between 80 and 90, 
the accuracy of detection at low packet drop rates decreased in the network. However the 
accuracy reached 100% when the number of packets being dropped increased. This same 






4.3.2. Undetected Rate 
 
 
Figure 17: Graph showing the number of attackers not identified after 20 minutes 
 
Figure 17 shows the rate of undetected attackers in the network. If a malicious node in 
the network was not identified within 20 minutes, it is said to have not been detected by 
our algorithm. Like the accuracy of detection, the rate of undetected attackers depends on 
the LQI values observed in the network and also the packet drop rate by the malicious 
node. The number of undetected attackers was found to decrease with the increase in 
packet drop rate. So an attacker that drops more packets has a higher chance being 
detected. Similarly the undetected rate in the network decreases with increase in observed 
LQI values. High link quality in the network aids in proper discrimination between 
maliciously dropped packets and normal packet loss. 
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From figure 17, we can observe that at high LQI values over 100, the number of 
undetected nodes is 0. As LQI values and the amount of packet drop rate decrease, the 
number of motes not detected in the network increases. For LQI values below 80, the 
highest amount of undetected nodes was observed at 8%. This rate decreased as the LQI 
values or packet drop rate increased. 
 
4.3.3. Communication Overhead 
 
The number of messages being transmitted in the network depends upon the data rate in 
the network and also the messages transmitted for enforcing various routing and 
cryptographic algorithms used in the network. In our case, we define communication 
overhead as the number of additional messages transmitted in the network for the proper 
functioning of our detection algorithm. 
 
To get the relative communication overhead of our algorithm, two identical networks as 
described in section 4.2.2 were used. The first network was not running our detection 
algorithm. The number of messages transmitted in this network has been logged. Our 
detection algorithm was incorporated into the second network and the number of 
messages transmitted by each node in the network has been logged. As described earlier, 
to ensure proper reception of ACK_MSG sent by the intermediate nodes, we made use of 
ACK messages. Each node must send back a ACK message to the intermediate nodes 
sending the ACK_MSG. This is necessary for proper functioning of our algorithm. By 
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comparing the logs from the two networks, we can get an idea of the relative 
communication overhead due to our algorithm. 
 
The ratio between the number of messages transmitted with and without the detection 
algorithm was calculated for different average LQI value ranges observed in the network. 
When the data rate in the network was 1 packet per second, with 100 second time interval 
between acknowledgement message transmissions and with average LQI value of 100, 
the average number of additional messages transmitted was found to be as shown in 
Figure 18 for each interval. 
 
 
Figure 18: Communication overhead with respect to different LQI ranges 
 
The number of additional messages for each interval of 100 seconds was computed and 
the average number of additional messages for a given LQI range was computed. 
Average number of messages represented in figure 18 is the ceil values of the average 
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computed. As there can‘t be any partial communications, we made use of the floor 
values. 
 
From the values observed, we can make the following inferences. The number of 
messages transmitted increased with a decrease in link quality in the network. Increase in 
number of messages transmitted is due to the fact that ACK messages were used. When a 
node does not successfully acknowledge an ACK_MSG transmission, retransmissions 
occur and number of retransmissions in the network increases with decrease in poor link 
quality.  
 
If there was no acknowledgement of ACK_MSG reception, we would see a constant 
communication overhead in the network. For a network transmitting at low data rates and 
having good average link quality among its nodes, we can eliminate the use of ACK 
messages. The probability that an ACK_MSG packet will be lost in such a network is 
very low due to these conditions. Hence elimination of the ACK messages results in 
constant communication overhead of 4 packets per n seconds, due to ACK_MSG 
transmissions, with no decrease in detection rate. 
 
4.4. Comparison With Other Approaches 
 
To show the merits of our algorithm we validate it with other selective forwarding attack 
detection algorithms. In this section we compare our algorithm to one described in [7]. 
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The comparison is done on three fronts; accuracy, undetected rate and communication 
overhead. We also need to compare both the algorithms at different link qualities. 
 
4.4.1. Accuracy of Detection 
 
In [7], the authors have provided us the accuracy of detection for their algorithm. As they 
use alarm packets to detect maliciously dropped packets, we can use the alarm reliability 
they provided to get the accuracy of detection. The two approaches differ in detecting 
selective forwarding attacks. While [7] tries to detect an attack by identifying each packet 
being maliciously dropped, our approach tries to detect a selective forwarding attack by 
observing the data transmissions in an interval of time. 
 
The authors of [7] have obtained their results by setting up a network of 400 motes. They 
use simulation at different channel error rates to obtain the accuracy of detection. They 
also make use of a transport layer retransmission policy with a default retry value of 5. 
This means that a packet will be retransmitted 5 times if the delivery fails. They mention 




Figure 19: Alarm reliability figures from [7] 
 
The results shown in figure 19 have been provided in [7]. From these results we can 
observe that the accuracy of detection decreases with respect to channel error rate in the 
network. Moreover, the accuracy decreases with decrease in maliciously dropped 
packets. The results for a malicious drop rate of 10%, 20% and 30% have been provided. 
 
Comparing our results with those in figure 16, we can observe that the accuracy of 
detection is similar in both the algorithms. When channel error rate falls as low as 20% 
only 65% of the malicious nodes are detected in the network using the algorithm from 
[7]. This can correspond to the LQI range of less than 80. We can see that our algorithm 
works better when the channel error rate is high. Also, from the two figures, we can see 
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that detection accuracy is slightly higher in our approach when the number of maliciously 
dropped packets is lower. 
 
4.4.2. Undetected Rate 
 
The other metric we consider in comparing both the algorithms is the undetected rate. 
The results provided by the authors of [7] are shown in figure 17. A similar simulated 
network setup used to estimate the accuracy of detection was used to find the undetected 
attacker rate in the network. 
 
 
Figure 20: Undetected rate as provided in [7] 
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Figure 17 shows the undetected rate observed in the network setup of real motes using 
our algorithm. The undetected rate in the network is similar using both the algorithms. 
The only difference is when the link quality is very poor. Our algorithm is shown to 
perform better if the link quality is poor. As described earlier, a link quality of less than 
80 can be seen as corresponding to 20 percent channel error rate shown in figure 20. By 
observing the values of undetected rate from the two figures, we observe that our 
algorithm has an edge when link quality is poor. 
 
4.4.3. Communication Overhead 
 
The main difference between our algorithm and the one presented in [7] is the 
communication overhead involved in enforcing the algorithms. The communication 
overhead for our algorithm has been provided in figure 18. From that figure we can 
observe that the number of additional messages transmitted in the network enforcing our 
algorithm depends on the link quality in the network. The higher the link quality the 




Figure 21: Relative communication provided in [7] 
 
The communication overhead for the other algorithm can be seen in figure 21. Relative 
communication overhead is presented instead of the number of extra messages 
transmitted in the network. Relative communication overhead can be computed by 
comparing the number of messages transmitted for a given time in a normal network with 
the network enforcing the detection algorithm. The algorithm presented in [7] had the 
following parameters; ACK_TTL value of 3 hops and ACK_span of 3 hops. This means 
that the acknowledgement messages travel for 3 hops. ACK_span controls the number of 
times an acknowledgement message is generated in the network. 
 
From figure 21 we can observe that the communication overhead in enforcing the other 
algorithm is at least 40% more than that observed in a normal network. For higher 
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malicious packet drop rates the communication overhead is even higher. It becomes more 
than 2 times the normal amount in some cases. 
 
Comparing these results with our algorithm, shown in figure 18, we can observe that the 
communication overhead to our algorithm is considerably lower. This is due to the fact 
we make use of cumulative acknowledgements. Additional messages are transmitted only 
when the link quality is poor and ACK_MSG transmissions are lost. If we compute the 
relative communication overhead, our algorithm has a worst case measure of 20% of the 
packets. This number can be computed by taking into consideration that the data rate 
used in our network is 1 packet per second and time interval is 100 seconds. The number 
of additional messages transmitted at poor link qualities as shown in figure 18 is about 
20. Hence, there is a communication overhead of 20%. 
 
Clearly from the above results, we can observe that the communication overhead 








In this thesis, we presented an algorithm for effectively detecting selective forwarding 
attacks. We performed real network test runs using sensor motes and computed detection 
accuracy, undetected attacker rate and communication overhead of our detection 
algorithm. Finally we compared the efficiency of our algorithm with previous work done 
in the area. Based on our comparison we found that our detection algorithm slightly 
increases attacker detection accuracy in networks having low communication quality 
while not compromising the undetected attacker rate. The main improvement comes in 
the form of decrease in communication overhead. We found that our algorithm greatly 
decreases the communication cost involved in detecting an attacker. Other improvements 
include eliminating the need for a synchronized clock, which is difficult to implement in 
a wireless sensor network. All these improvements help to secure a wireless sensor 
network by not compromising longevity. 
 
In the future, we would like to implement a Rayleigh curve fitting algorithm for the PRR 
distribution to make it more accurate. Moreover, we need to address the issue of time 
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